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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between Hofstede’s national culture indices (IDV, PSI,
MAS, and UAI), economic wealth (GNI), and software piracy rates (SPR). Although a
number of studies have already examined this relationship, the contribution of this paper is
two-fold. First, we will examine not only the relationship to SPR, but also the relationship to
declines in SPR. The average national SPR has been declining since 1994, although the
global rate has leveled off since 1997 and has recently seen a slight increase. Second, we will
use a 9-year dataset stretching from 1994 to 2002 to assess wealth and SPR. This allows for
a more sensitive analysis of the relative wealth of a country and the underlying SPR. Using a
sample of 45 countries, we find a significant negative relationship between GNI, IDV and
SPR. We also find that decline in SPR is a function of culture (PDI), not wealth. Areas of
further research are discussed.
Keywords: Software Piracy, National Culture, Economic Wealth.

1. Introduction
Software piracy continues to be a major problem for the software industry. The software
piracy rate (SPR) is calculated as the number of illegal copies of software as a proportion of
the total number of business applications in use. Although the global SPR has declined from
49% in 1994 to 39% in 2002, the rate seems to have stabilized since 1997, hovering between
36% and 40%, with estimated losses to the software industry averaging $11.9 billion a year
(BSA, 2003).
While the global SPR has stabilized, the average national SPR has continued to
decline, from 76% in 1994 to 55% in 2002. The difference between the global SPR and the
average national SPR is that the global SPR treats the world as a single market, and so, the
rate is sensitive to the SPR of the larger software markets, such as the US, China, Japan, and
Germany. A decline of ten percentage points in the SPR of these four countries in 2002
would reduce the global SPR by 10 percentage points (from 39% to 29%), whereas the
elimination of software piracy in countries such as Bahrain, Kenya, Reunion, and Zimbabwe
would have no impact.
Countries with high SPRs include Vietnam (95%), China (92%), Indonesia (89%),
Russia (89%), and the Ukraine (89%), while the US (23%), Denmark (24%), New Zealand
(24%), and Finland (25%) have the lowest SPRs in the world. Countries responsible for the
greatest financial losses include China (US$2.41Bn), the US (US$1.96Bn), Japan
(US$1.47Bn), and Germany (US$0.93Bn).
Economic wealth and Hofstede’s national culture dimensions (e.g., see Hofstede &
Hofstede, 2005) are commonly used to explain these differences in national SPRs (Moores,
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2003; Shin et al., 2004). Economic wealth contributes because most software vendors use the
same pricing strategy across the globe, but what is affordable in the US may be too expensive
for ordinary people in countries such as Vietnam, where per capita income is less than 10%
of that in the US. Culture contributes because in societies that encourage close ties between
members of the in-group over individuality and personal property, sharing is the norm and
software piracy rates tend to be higher.
No study has taken into account the fact that national SPRs have been continuing to
decline. This decline may be partly explained by an increase in the economic wealth of
almost all countries, with Ireland (108.1%), China (104.5%), Vietnam (79.7%), and Poland
(72.5%) showing prodigious increases in per capita income from 1994 to 2002. However,
associated declines in SPR have not always followed suit, with Ireland (-43.2%) and Poland
(-29.9%) showing strong reductions in software piracy, while China (-5.2%) and Vietnam (5.0%) show very little.
In this study we relate economic wealth and Hofstede’s national culture dimensions to
SPR to confirm the expected result that wealth and culture play a role in promoting levels in
software piracy. We will then calculate rates of change in SPR and determine whether wealth
or culture can also be used to explain differences in the rate at which software piracy has
declined. In the next sections we will develop a set of hypotheses to be tested and then define
the measures used. We show that levels of software piracy are mainly economic, while
decline in software piracy is a function of culture.

2. Theoretical Background
At the individual (micro) level, the cost of legal software has often been cited as a reason for
engaging in software piracy (Cheng et al., 1997). The more expensive the software, the less
likely someone would allow a copy to be made for someone else (Glass & Wood, 1996),
while reduction in the price of legal software is associated with a lower intention to engage in
software piracy (Moores & Dhillon, 2000). At the national (macro) level, the ability to
purchase software becomes a function of per capita national income, with a strong negative
relationship typically found between wealth and SPR, such that, as wealth increases SPR
decreases (Gopal & Sanders, 2000). Our first hypothesis is:
H1:

There is a strong negative relationship between per capita national income and
software piracy rates.

Hofstede’s national culture dimensions indicate differences in work value
perspectives between national cultures (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). The dimensions include
the individualism-collectivism (IDV) and masculinity-femininity (MAS) poles, and the power
distance (PDI), and uncertainty avoidance (UAI) indices.
In brief, IDV refers to the extent to which individuality is prized above group
(collectivist) ideals, MAS refers to traditional masculine ideals of achievement, power, and
control, PDI refers to the degree of acceptance of equality or inequality within society, while
UAI refers to the need for rules and regulations to avoid ambiguity and uncertainty in social
settings. While there are criticisms of the measures (McSweeney, 2002), they have been
replicated and supported (Merritt, 2000; Sondergaard, 1994).
IDV is often the only cultural factor that is significantly related to SPR (Husted, 2000;
Moores, 2003; Shin et al., 2004). In high IDV countries, such as the US, Australia, the UK,
and The Netherlands, there is a greater perception of personal property, which may reduce the
likelihood a person will give away copies of their software. Thus, we would expect IDV to be
the only cultural dimension to be related with SPR, and in line with wealth, we would expect
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there to be a strong negative relationship with SPR, such that, as IDV increases SPR
decreases. Our second hypothesis is:
H2:

There is a strong negative relationship between individualism-collectivism and
software piracy rates.

When considering declines in SPR, we can speculate that if economic wealth is a
strong predictor of the level of software piracy, then countries that experience the greatest
increase in economic wealth will also experience the greatest decline in software piracy.
Although habit may lead some people to continue pirating software (Limayem et al., 2004),
we would expect a strong positive relationship between wealth and declines in SPR, such
that, as wealth increases the rate of decline in SPR also increases. Using the same argument,
and given the expected strong relationship between wealth and IDV, we also expect a strong
positive relationship between IDV and decline in SPR. Our third and fourth hypotheses are:
H3:
H4:

There is a strong positive relationship between per capita national income and
declines in software piracy rates.
There is a strong positive relationship between individualism-collectivism and
declines in software piracy rates.

The relationship between PDI, MAS, UAI and decline in SPR is more difficult to
determine. No studies have found a significant relationship between these three culture
variables and levels of SPR. If we assume that software piracy is a form of corruption,
however, there is literature which has found significant relationships between Hofstede’s
culture variables and national corruption levels (e.g., Husted, 1999; Park, 2003; Ronkainen &
Guerrero-Cusumano, 2001). National corruption is often measured using the Corruption
Perceptions
Index
(CPI)
developed
by
Transparency
International
(see
http://www.transparency.org/). A composite score is generated for each country based on
surveys of businesspeople and analysts from around the world.
The relationship between culture and corruption is that in cultures with high PDI there
is an expectation and acceptance of unequal distributions of power, which also permits for the
abuse of power. There is also the expectation that those in power will not tolerate ‘whistleblowing,’ and will prevent or punish any such attempts. In this context, corruption and other
types of illegal behavior can be rife. In cultures with high MAS, traditional masculine roles
are encouraged, and individuals, especially males, are expected to be ambitious, competitive,
and strive for material success. It is suggested that this “get ahead” mentality breeds
corruption. In cultures with high UAI there is a need to reduce uncertainty, and corruption,
often in the form of bribes, is one means of securing a certain result.
It seems reasonable to suggest, therefore, that when corruption is high there is little
motivation to resist pirating software, and therefore, there will be lower declines in SPR.
Corruption would allow the arcades that sell pirated software to exist, and for “tip-offs” to be
given should there be a raid by the police. We would thus expect a strong negative
relationship between PDI, MAS, and UAI and decline in SPR, such that, as PDI, MAS, and
UAI increase so declines in SPR will decrease. Our final three hypotheses are:
H5:
H6:

There is a strong negative relationship between power distance and declines in
software piracy rates.
There is a strong negative relationship between masculinity-femininity and
declines in software piracy rates.
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H7:

There is a strong negative relationship between uncertainty avoidance and
declines in software piracy rates.

3. Method
We can derive a dataset of 45 countries for which national culture, economic wealth, and
SPR statistics are available. Measures of national culture are derived from Hofstede (e.g.,
Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). Economic wealth is derived from the World Bank online
database, and defined in terms of per capita gross national income (GNI), converted to
international dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates. Measures of SPR are derived
from the 8th annual BSA global software piracy report (BSA, 2003). This report includes SPR
statistics from 1994 to 2002. For 2003, BSA changed the methodology, and so the results of
the latest survey cannot be directly compared to previous years.
Although most studies relate Hofstede’s culture dimensions to one-year statistics on
economic wealth and SPR, this single-year approach increases the possibility of capitalizing
on chance, where data from a particular year may happen to show a better fit than for other
years. In this study we will smooth the wealth and SPR data in order to be more sensitive to
the underlying trend in wealth and SPR, rather than to the events of a particular year. We
therefore define GNI and SPR as the average over the period 1994 to 2002.
We define two measures of decline in SPR. The simplest, δSPR, will be defined in
terms of the relative difference in SPR from 1994 to 2002, expressed as:

"SPR =

SPR2002 ! SPR1994
SPR1994

The second measure, ΔSPR, will take into account fluctuations in SPR from year-toyear, and be defined in terms of the average change in SPR, expressed as:
)SPR =

2001

' SPRi +1 ( SPRi $
""
SPRi
i =1994 &
#

! %%

For countries with the same rate of decline in SPR year-on-year, δSPR and ΔSPR will
have the same value. The empirical analysis will determine which measure is a better fit. To
ensure meaningful signs for each of the parameters, δSPR and ΔSPR will be defined in
absolute values, where a higher decline is denoted by a higher value of δSPR or ΔSPR. Thus,
if a parameter increases the decline in SPR it will have a positive sign, whereas a parameter
that reduces the decline will have a negative sign.
We will develop three regression models. The independent variables in each case will
be the same, that is, GNI and the four culture dimensions IDV, PDI, MAS, and UAI. In the
first model the dependent variable will be SPR. In the second and third models the dependent
variable will be decline in SPR, defined in terms of δSPR or ΔSPR. We will use Cook’s
Distance, D, to determine the existence of any outliers.

4. Results
Summary statistics, including correlations between each of the variables, is given in Table 1.
As expected, there is a strong (p<0.01) negative correlation between SPR, GNI, and IDV, as
well as a strong positive correlation between GNI and IDV. Further significant correlations
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Table 1. Summary Statistics (Mean, Standard Deviation, and Correlation with other Variables)
Var.

Mean

StdDev

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1. SPR

57.36

17.52

-.386
(.009)

2. δSPR

30.51

11.86

-----

-.360
(.015)
.993
(.000)

3. ΔSPR

35.29

16.53

-.856
(.000)
.263
(.081)
.237
(.118)

4. GNI

14.77

9.31

-.819
(.000)
.295
(.049)
.286
(.057)
.786
(.000)

5. IDV

44.40

26.42

.680
(.000)
-.478
(.001)
-.486
(.001)
-.687
(.000)
-.708
(.000)

6. PDI

55.31

22.90

-.096
(.573)
-.193
(.205)
-.237
(.117)
.008
(.957)
.046
(.766)
.101
(.508)

7. MAS

49.16

19.16

.365
(.014)
.086
(.573)
.053
(.731)
-.360
(.015)
-.413
(.013)
.216
(.155)
.035
(.819)

8. UAI

66.04

24.44

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----
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Table 2. Regression Results, Whole Sample [n=45]
Var.

BETA

StdErr of
BETA

B

StdErr of
B

t(39)

p-level

8.5099
-4.3220
-2.4936
.8044
-1.1748
.2263

.0000
.0001
.0170
.4261
.2472
.8222

3.4479
-.3124
.4194
-2.3484
-1.1238
1.4087

.0014
.7564
.6772
.0240
.2680
.1668

3.5118
-.6431
.4166
-2.5991
-1.4087
1.0858

.0011
.5239
.6793
.0131
.1668
.2842

(a) Dep.Var.= SPR (R2=.7979; F[5,39]=30.7910, p<.0000)
Intercept
GNI
IDV
PDI
MAS
UAI

-.5311
-.3271
.0887
-.0866
.0182

.1229
.1312
.1102
.0737
.0805

81.0164
-.9989
-.2169
.0678
-.0791
.0131

9.5203
.2311
.0870
.0843
.0674
.0577

(b) Dep.Var.=δSPR (R2=.2914; F[5,39]=3.2071, p<.0161)
Intercept
GNI
IDV
PDI
MAS
UAI

-.0719
.1030
-.4846
-.1550
.2123

.2301
.2456
.2064
.1380
.1507

41.6123
-.0915
.0462
-.2511
-.0960
.1030

12.0690
.2930
.1102
.1069
.0854
.0731

(c) Dep.Var.=ΔSPR (R2=.3065; F[5,39]=3.4467, p<.0113)
Intercept
GNI
IDV
PDI
MAS
UAI

-.1464
.1012
-.5306
-.1923
.1619

.2276
.2430
.2042
.1365
.1491

58.4161
-.2597
.0633
-.3830
-.1658
.1095

16.6343
.4038
.1520
.1474
.1177
.1001

can also be seen between PDI and most of the other variables. There does not appear to be a
problem of multicollinearity, however, with variance inflation factors (VIFs) ranging from
1.05 to 3.32, well below even the most conservative threshold of VIF<5.3 (Hair et al., 1998).
The results of the regression analysis are given in Table 2. When SPR is the
dependent variable (see Table 2a), GNI and IDV are significant predictors. This provides
support for H1 and H2. All cases are within 4 times the mean Cook’s Distance (D=0.0218),
suggesting there are no outliers.
When δSPR is the dependent variable (see Table 2b), PDI is the only significant
variable. The alternative measure ΔSPR produces a marginally better fit, as shown by the
slightly higher R2 and F-statistic (see Table 2c). The result in both cases is the same,
however, with PDI being the only significant variable, providing support for H5. None of the
other hypotheses are supported. For both the δSPR and ΔSPR models there is one outlier,
namely Japan, with a Cook’s Distance more than 8 times the mean (D=0.2582, and 0.2391,
respectively).
Because of the size of the software market, Japan is an influential data point and
capable of changing the global SPR with changes to its own SPR. Japan is also an extreme
example of a worrying trend in software piracy rates from 1994 to 2001. From 1994 to 1997
most countries made significant improvements to their SPR, leveling off between 1997 and
1999, and then increasing from 1999 to 2001.
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For instance, Japan made prodigious inroads into software piracy from 1994 to 1997,
more than halving the SPR from 66% to 32%. Other countries that also made great
improvements over that time period include Italy (-38%) and Denmark (-33%). From 1999,
however, Japan’s SPR increased to a high of 37% in 2001. Germany (+26%), France (+18%),
and India (+15%) also saw notable increases. Most countries, including Japan, then saw a
slight decline in SPR in 2002. In the latest survey using the new methodology, Japan’s SPR
stands at 29% (BSA, 2004). Removing Japan from the dataset improves the R2 for δSPR and
ΔSPR (.3380, and .3576, respectively).

5. Discussion
The results of this study confirm the suggestion that rates of software piracy are a function of
economic wealth. The significance of the IDV measure should be interpreted as a corollary to
wealth, given the high correlation between the two measures (r=.786, p=.000), and the higher
BETA for GNI. GNI on its own explains more than 73% of the variance in SPR and should
be considered the prime motivating factor.
This would also suggest that even for countries with relatively high IDV, if wealth is
relatively low software piracy will still be a problem. Ireland is an example of such a country,
with a relatively high IDV score of 70, but which also, until recently, was one of the poorest
countries in Western Europe. From 1994 to 2002, Ireland’s SPR averaged 57%, compared to
an average in Western Europe of 40%.
The issue of wealth (and hence, the cost of legal software) suggests there is a need to
investigate the difference between the “haves” and the “have nots.” Shin et al. (2004) suggest
that the relationship between culture, economic wealth, and software piracy is different
depending on whether a country is classified as rich or poor. For poorer countries (per capita
GDP<$6,000), software piracy rates decline more than three times faster with each $1,000
increase in GDP than for richer countries. This result suggests that software piracy will
remain a problem even for the richest countries. The results must be viewed with caution,
however, because the sample size used by Shin et al. is small (n<25).
Dividing this sample into poorer countries with higher SPR, and richer countries with
lower SPR, also produces differences. The regression models are not stable, however, with a
series of outliers affecting the overall results of the regression analysis. In spite of these
problems, an intriguing area of further research would be to investigate how reasons for
engaging in software piracy change as countries become richer. As countries become richer,
however, SPR still varies greatly and the role of other factors, such as culture, would seem to
become more important.
In particular, when assessing declines in software piracy the issue appears to be a
function of culture, not economic wealth. The significant negative relationship between PDI
and δSPR and ΔSPR suggest that in cultures where power distance is high, such as Malaysia,
Indonesia, and India, declines in software are half the sample average. This result is
consistent with studies that relate Hofstede’s national culture dimensions to levels of
corruption. PDI tends to be the most significant cultural factor (e.g., see Husted, 1999; Park,
2003). This suggests that the natural decline in SPR that would be expected due to increasing
GNI for almost all countries is significantly reduced by factors related to national corruption
levels.

6. Conclusions
The results of this study confirm the suggestion that overall levels of software piracy are
strongly connected to the economic wealth of a country, while the potential for corruption
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inherent in countries with high PDI slows the natural decline in SPR. This suggests that little
can be done to reduce software piracy in economically-disadvantaged countries. Although
varying the price according to the wealth of the country may help to remove the excuse
behind digital theft, it would be difficult to prevent the (now-legal) trade in cheap software
across borders for nothing more than the price of a postage stamp, and effectively rewards
countries for failing to protect intellectual property rights.
Similarly, if the rate of decline is a function of PDI, and PDI is an immutable
component of national culture, there would appear to be little hope of challenging the worst
offending countries. It is unclear what would be needed to bring about a fundamental shift in
the PDI of a whole country. On the other hand, there is evidence that culture is not
immutable. The close association between wealth and most of the culture variables, including
PDI, may suggest that cultural changes are already ongoing. We would expect, for instance,
differences as countries become richer. The sample of countries for which Hofstede national
culture scores exist is simply too small to perform more sophisticated comparisons. Values
are also missing for important countries responsible for significant levels of software piracy,
such as China, Russia, and Vietnam.
These and other problems may be overcome by extending this research with a microlevel (individual) analysis. By asking individuals about their perception of software piracy we
would be able to confirm whether the culture variables still apply, and whether levels of
corruption suggested by PDI is the main reason for continuing to engage in software piracy.
At the individual level we may find a number of other factors that lead someone to engage in,
or refrain from, pirating software. After all, even in the most corrupt of countries, not
everyone will engage in software piracy.
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